Fodor y Kim en torno a la posibilidad de las ciencias especiales, la realizabilidad múltiple y el reduccionismo

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dc.contributor.authorMorales Otero, Juan Diego
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T14:22:30Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T14:22:30Z
dc.date.issued2013-07-01
dc.description.abstractEl argumento crucial que se supone refuta al reduccionismo de una vez y para siempre es la idea de la realizabilidad múltiple (R M) de las propiedades superiores o no físicas. A l intro-ducir y desarrollar esta idea, autores como Putnam y Fodor reafirmaron filosóficamente el estatus de las ciencias especiales como ciencias autónomas con pretensiones explicativas nomológicas. En total oposición, Kim construye un argumento bastante peculiar que toma a la RM como premisa para concluir en la reducción de las ciencias especiales. En la primera parte del artículo, analizo el razonamiento de Kim y muestro su fundamental dependencia del así llamado principio de herencia causal, que sostiene que los poderes causales superiores, como los mentales, se derivan de los poderes causales físicos al ser realizados por estos y supervenirlos. En la segunda, examino la respuesta de Fodor en tanto realizadores que se encuentran en mundos metafísicamente posibles distintos al nuestro. En la tercera, arguyo que la RM no es suficiente para mantener una posición antirreduccionista y que debemos adicionar el rechazo del principio de herencia causal de Kim, rechazo que tendrá que ser articulado en términos de una causalidad descendente.spa
dc.description.abstractenglishThe supposed crucial argument that refutes reductionism once and for all is the idea of the multiple realizability (MR) of the higher or non-physical properties. Introducing and developing this notion, authors such as Putnam and Fodor philosophically reaffirmed the status of the special sciences as autonomous sciences with explanatory nomological pretensions. In total opposition, Kim constructs a very peculiar argument that takes the MR as its premise and concludes in the reduction of the special sciences. In the first part of the article I analyze Kim’s reasoning and show its fundamental dependence on the so-called causal inheritance principle, which holds that the higher causal powers, including mental ones, are derived from, given that they are realized by and supervenient on, the physical causal powers. In the second I examine Fodor’s response in terms of realizers located at metaphysically possible worlds different to ours. In the third, I argue that MR is not sufficient to maintain an anti-reductionist position, and that we must add the rejection of the Kim’s causal inheritance principle, which would have to be articulated in terms of downward causation.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v13i27.1631
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6248
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 13 Núm 27, 2014, 63-84spa
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dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/1631
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectRealizabilidad múltiplespa
dc.subjectCausalidad superiorspa
dc.subjectReducciónspa
dc.subjectEmergenciaspa
dc.subject.keywordsMultiple realizabilityspa
dc.subject.keywordsHigher causationspa
dc.subject.keywordsReductionspa
dc.subject.keywordsEmergencespa
dc.titleFodor y Kim en torno a la posibilidad de las ciencias especiales, la realizabilidad múltiple y el reduccionismospa
dc.title.translatedKim and Fodor on the possibility of the special sciences, multiple realizability and reductionspa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

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