La noción de poder causal. Consecuencias de diferentes teorías modales y causales

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dc.contributor.authorAlvarado Marambio, José Tomás
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0003-2324-8458
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T14:30:05Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T14:30:05Z
dc.date.issued2014-07-01
dc.description.abstractEste trabajo trata de clarificar la noción de poder causal. Se sostiene que un poder causal debe ser comprendido en relación con cuestiones más amplias de metafísica modal y de causalidad. Se describen cuatro teorías alternativas principales de concebirlo: (i) como proyección subjetiva de nuestra imaginación o de nuestras capacidades cognitivas de concebir algo, (ii) como resultado de la semejanza entre diferentes mundos posibles, (iii) como producto de la recombinación de entidades independientes entre sí, y (iv) como entidad primitiva, no reducible a otros estados de cosas más básicos. Se afirma que la adopción de una u otra de estas alternativas tiene consecuencias importantes en varios debates donde se ha usado la noción de poder causal.spa
dc.description.abstractenglishThis work tries to clarify the notion of causal power. It is contended that a causal power should be understood in relation with broader issues in modal and causal metaphysics. Four main alternative theories of causal powers are described: (i) causal powers as subjec-tive projections of our imagination or of our cognitive capabilities to conceive something, (ii) causal powers as the result of the resemblance between different possible worlds, (iii) causal powers as the result of the recombination of entities, independent between them, and (iv) causal powers as primitive entities, not reducible to other –more basic– states of affairs. It is contended that the adoption of one or other of these alternatives has impor-tant consequences in several debates where the notion of causal power has been used.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v14i29.661
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6254
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 14 Núm 29, 2014, 7-32.spa
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dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/661
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectPoder causalspa
dc.subjectCausalidadspa
dc.subjectModalidadspa
dc.subjectDisposiciónspa
dc.subject.keywordsCausal powerspa
dc.subject.keywordsCausalityspa
dc.subject.keywordsModalityspa
dc.subject.keywordsDispositionspa
dc.titleLa noción de poder causal. Consecuencias de diferentes teorías modales y causalesspa
dc.title.translatedThe notion of causal power consequences of Different modal and causal theoriesspa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

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