¿Qué es el realismo estructural óntico?: una aproximación al debate actual sobre el realismo científico.

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.contributor.authorBorge, Bruno
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-1755-9690
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T15:42:34Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T15:42:34Z
dc.date.issued2013-07-01
dc.description.abstractEl Realismo Estructural ha nacido como una posición promisoria capaz de conciliar las intuiciones que subyacen a los argumentos más influyentes que han esgrimido los realistas y antirrealistas científicos, pretendiendo así instaurarse como una posición que reúne lo mejor de ambos mundos. Las dificultades que sus formulaciones iniciales han tenido para afrontar las objeciones de los críticos han llevado a algunos a profundizar los supuestos que sostienen al Realismo Estructural, convirtiendo sus tesis epistémicas en compromisos ontológicos: la ciencia conoce solamente la estructura del mundo inobservable, porque nada más hay por conocer. Así, el Realismo Estructural Óntico aboga por una reconceptualización metafísica de los objetos en términos puramente estructurales, proyecto que se le ha imputado falencias tanto conceptuales como metodológicas. El presente trabajo reconstruye los principales argumentos que sustentan esta posición, ofrece una clasificación para las variantes que ha mostrado en la literatura reciente, y emprende una revisión crítica de las principales objeciones que se han alzado en su contra, mostrando que se trata de una posición tanto metodológica como conceptual-mente sostenible.spa
dc.description.abstractenglishOntic Structural Realism was born as a promising position capable of reconcile the intui-tions that underlie the most influential arguments that have been advanced by scientific realists and anti-realists, pretending so to be instituted as a position that combines the best of both worlds. The difficulties that have had their initial formulations to meet the objections of critics have led some to deepening the assumptions that support the Struc-tural Realism, turning their epistemic thesis into ontological commitments: Science knows only the structure of the unobservable world, because nothing else there is to know. Thus, Ontic Structural Realism advocates a metaphysical reconceptualization of objects in purely structural terms, project that have been attributed both conceptual and methodological deficiencies. This work presents the main arguments in support of this position, provides a classification for the variants that has been shown in recent literature, and undertakes a critical review of the main objections that have been raised against it, showing that it is both a methodologically and conceptually tenable position.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v13i27.1636
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6265
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 13 Núm 27, 2013,149-176spa
dc.relation.referencesArmstong, David Malet. “In Defence of Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64.1 (1986): 85-88.spa
dc.relation.referencesBigelow, John & Pargeter, Robert. Science and Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.spa
dc.relation.referencesBusch, Jacob. “What structures could not be,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17 (2003): 211–225.spa
dc.relation.referencesChakravartty, Anjan. “Semirealism,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Science, 29 (1998): 391–408.—, “The structuralist conception of objects”. Philosophy of Science, 70.5 (2003): 867-878.—, A metaphysics for scientific realism: Knowing the unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.spa
dc.relation.referencesEsfeld, Michael. “Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35 (2004): 601–617.—, “The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism”. Interna-tional Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23. 2 (2009): 179–194spa
dc.relation.referencesFrench, Steven. “Identity and individuality in classical and quantum physics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1989): 432–446.—, “On the withering away of physical objects,” E. Castellani (ed.), Interpre-ting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.—, “Structure as a weapon of the realist”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106.1, (2006): 169–187.spa
dc.relation.referencesFrench, Steven & Krause, Decio. “A formal approach to quantum non-indi-viduality”. Synthese, 102 (1995): 195–214.—, Identity in physics: A historical philosophical, and formal analysis. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006.spa
dc.relation.referencesFrench, Steven & Ladyman, James. “Reinflating the semantic approach.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13 (1999): 103–121.—, “Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure.” Synthese, 136 (2003a): 31–56.—, “Between platonism and phenomenalism: Reply to Cao.” Synthese, 136 (2003b): 73–78.spa
dc.relation.referencesLaudan, Larry. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981): 19–48.spa
dc.relation.referencesLadyman, James. “What is structural realism?” Studies in History and Philo-sophy of Science, 29 (1998): 409–424.spa
dc.relation.referencesLadyman, James & Ross, Don. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Natura-lised, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.spa
dc.relation.referencesMelia, Joseph. & Juha. Saatsi. “Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57 (2006): 561–585.spa
dc.relation.referencesMolnar, George. “Kneale’s argument revisited”, Philosophical Review, 78 (1969): 79–89.—, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, S. Mumford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford Universityspa
dc.relation.referencesPress, 2003.spa
dc.relation.referencesMorganti, Matteo. “On the preferability of epistemic structural realism”. Synthese, 142.1 (2004): 81–107.—, Identity, individuality and the ontological interpretation of quantum mecha-nics. PhD Thesis, University of London, 2008.—, Weak discernibility, quantum mechanics and the generalist picture, forth-coming in Facta Philosophica, 2009.spa
dc.relation.referencesMumford, Stephen. Dispositions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.—, Laws in Nature, London: Routledge, 2004spa
dc.relation.referencesMumford, Stephen & Anjum, Rani. Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.spa
dc.relation.referencesNewman, Max. “Mr. Russell’s causal theory of perception.” Mind, 37 (1928): 137–148.spa
dc.relation.referencesPsillos, Stathis. “Is Structural Realism Possible?” Philosophy of Science, 68 (2001): S13–S24.—, “The, Structure, the Whole, Structure and Nothing But, the Structure?” Philosophy of Science, 73 (2006): 560–570.—, “Adding Modality to Ontic Structuralism: An Exploration and Critique.” En: E. Landry & D. Rickles (eds), Structure, Object, and Causality, Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science; Dordrecht: Springer, (2012): 169-186.spa
dc.relation.referencesPutnam, Hilary. Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.spa
dc.relation.referencesRussell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927.spa
dc.relation.referencesTegmark, Max. “The mathematical universe”. Foundations of Physics, 38 (2008): 101–150.spa
dc.relation.referencesVot s i s , Io a n n i s . The epistemological status of scientific theories: An investigation of the structural realist account. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2004.spa
dc.relation.referencesVan Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198 0.—, “Structure and Perspective: Philosophical Perplexity and Paradox” M.L. Dalla Chiara et al. (eds.) Logic and Scientific Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997.—, “Structure: Its Shadow and Substance”, PhilSci Archive, en https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000631/—, “Structure: Its shadow and substance.” The British Journal for the Philo-sophy of Science, 57 (2006): 275–307.—, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press , 2008.spa
dc.relation.referencesWorrall, John. “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica, 43 (1989): 99–124.spa
dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/1636
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectRealismo científicospa
dc.subjectRealismo estructuralspa
dc.subjectRealismo estructural ónticospa
dc.subject.keywordsScientific realismspa
dc.subject.keywordsStructural realismspa
dc.subject.keywordsOntic structural realismspa
dc.title¿Qué es el realismo estructural óntico?: una aproximación al debate actual sobre el realismo científico.spa
dc.title.translatedWhat is ontic structural realism?: An approach to the current debate on scientific realismspa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

Archivos

Bloque original
Mostrando 1 - 1 de 1
Miniatura
Nombre:
RCFC2013.jpg
Tamaño:
108.46 KB
Formato:
Joint Photographic Experts Group/JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF)
Descripción:
Descargar
Bloque de licencias
Mostrando 1 - 1 de 1
No hay miniatura disponible
Nombre:
license.txt
Tamaño:
1.71 KB
Formato:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Descripción:
Descargar

Colecciones

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia