Palabra y concepto: acercamiento a un eliminativismo conceptual en ciencia cognitiva

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dc.contributor.authorContreras Kallens, Pablo Andrés
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-3805-3488
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-11T13:42:37Z
dc.date.available2021-10-11T13:42:37Z
dc.date.issued2014-07-01
dc.description.abstractEn este artículo, me concentro en una pregunta de carácter metateórico respecto de la teoría de conceptos en ciencia cognitiva: ¿es necesaria la postulación de conceptos? Para responderla, inicio mi argumentación desde el punto de partida de que los conceptos son entidades teóricas inobservables postuladas con fines explicativos y de coherencia con una teoría. Me baso en esto para dividir los desiderata de una teoría ideal presen-tados por Fodor (1998) y Prinz (2002) en desiderata explicativos y desiderata teóricos. Los desiderata teóricos son sólo compromisos con la estructura de la Teoría Representa-cional de la Mente, por lo que no es menester aceptarlos. Así, identificaré los explanandade la postulación de conceptos mediante el análisis de los desiderata explicativos. Una vez definido este punto, presentaré tanto descripciones alternativas de los fenómenos como explicaciones plausibles de ellos en esos términos. Con esto, pretendo minar los cimientos de lo que ha sido considerado como el mayor argumento a favor de la exis-tencia de conceptos: su exclusividad como explicación de sus explananda. Concluyo con algunas observaciones acerca de las consecuencias teóricas y metateóricas de los argu-mentos desarrollados.spa
dc.description.abstractenglishIn this paper, I focus on a metatheoretical question about the theory of concepts in cognitive science: Is the positing of concepts necessary? To answer this question, I take as my starting point the assumption that concepts are unobservable theoretical entities posited to serve of both explanatory and coherence purposes. Based on this, I make a distinction between the desiderata of an ideal theory of concepts put forward by Fodor (1998) and Prinz (2002) in explanatory desiderata and theoretical desiderata. As theo-retical desiderata are compromises imposed by the Representational Theory of Mind, their acceptance is not a requirement. I will then identify the explananda that concepts are posited to explain by analizing only the explanatory desiderata. Once they have been identified, I will put forward both alternative descriptions of the phenomena and plau-sible explanations of them in those terms. Thus, I expect to overturn the foundation of what has been considered as the main argument for the existence of concepts: their exclusivity as explanations of their explananda. I conclude with some remarks on the theoretical and metatheoretical consequences of the proposed arguments.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v14i29.667
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6162
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 14 Núm 29, 2014, 139-160.spa
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dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/667
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectCoordinación sensoriomotoraspa
dc.subjectConstitución lingüística de la cogniciónspa
dc.subjectTeoría representacional de la mentespa
dc.subject.keywordsSensorimotor coordinationspa
dc.subject.keywordsLinguistic constitution of cognitionspa
dc.subject.keywordsRepresenta-tional theory of mindspa
dc.titlePalabra y concepto: acercamiento a un eliminativismo conceptual en ciencia cognitivaspa
dc.title.translatedWord and concept: an approach to concept eliminativism in cognitive sciencespa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

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