Realismo directo: ¿una ilusión?

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dc.contributor.authorArdila, Juan David
dc.contributor.authorRincón, Mario
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0003-4718-8787
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0001-5571-1473
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-03T16:12:57Z
dc.date.available2021-11-03T16:12:57Z
dc.date.issued2011-07-01
dc.description.abstractNuestro propósito, en este ensayo, es criticar la tesis del principio fenoménico, vital en los argumentos de la ilusión y de la alucinación. Para esto, defendemos una posición intencionalista con respecto a la experiencia perceptual. En este escrito, nuestro propósito es también responder a algunas críticas que se le hacen al intencionalista. Mostramos que estas críticas no son satisfactorias y que por lo tanto las razones que esgrimen los intencionalistas en contra del principio fenoménico siguen siendo válidasspa
dc.description.abstractenglishIn this essay our aim is to criticize the phenomenal principle, vital in the arguments from illusion and hallucination. For the sake of this, we claim for an intentionalist position with respect to perceptual experience. In this paper, our aim is also to respond to some critics made to the intentionalist. We show that these critics are not satisfactory and therefore the reasons against phenomenal principle are still trueeng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v11i23.1704
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6294
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 0124-4620, Vol. 11 Núm 23, 2011, 131-155.spa
dc.relation.referencesBlock, Ned. “On a confusion about a Function Consciousness”. The Nature of Consciousness: philosophical debates. Ed. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere. Cambridge (MA) MIT Press, 1997.spa
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dc.relation.referencesChisholm, Roderick. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007spa
dc.relation.referencesDennett, Daniel C. Content and Consciousness. New York: Routledge, 1969.spa
dc.relation.referencesGallagher, Shaun, & Dan Zahavi. The phenomenological mind: an introduc-tion to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Londres: Routledge, 2010.spa
dc.relation.referencesFish, William. Philosophy of perception: a contemporary introduction. New York: Routledge, 2010.spa
dc.relation.referencesJackson, Frank. Perception: A representative theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.spa
dc.relation.referencesLutz, Antoine, & Evan Thompson. “Neurophenomenology”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.9-10 (2003): 31-52.spa
dc.relation.referencesMartin, Michael G. F. “Uncovering Appearances”. No publicado.spa
dc.relation.referencesMellor, D. H. “Crane’s Waterfall Illusion”. Analysis 48.3 (1988): 147-150.spa
dc.relation.referencesNoë, Alva. Action in perception. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2004spa
dc.relation.referencesPeacocke, Christopher. Sense and content: experience, thought and their rela-tions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983spa
dc.relation.referencesRobinson, Howard. Perception. New York: Routledge, 1994.spa
dc.relation.referencesSmith, A.D. The problem of perception. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2002.spa
dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/1704
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectPrincipio fenoménicospa
dc.subjectIntencionalismospa
dc.subjectFenomenologíaspa
dc.subjectRepresentaciónspa
dc.subject.keywordsPhenomenal Principlespa
dc.subject.keywordsIntentionalismspa
dc.subject.keywordsPhenomenologyspa
dc.subject.keywordsRepresentationspa
dc.titleRealismo directo: ¿una ilusión?spa
dc.title.translatedDirect Realism: An illusion?spa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

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Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia