¿Eres un realista selectivo dialeteísta y no te has dado cuenta?

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dc.contributor.authorMartínez Ordaz, María del Rosario
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0003-2118-3515
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-11T13:47:20Z
dc.date.available2021-10-11T13:47:20Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-01
dc.description.abstractEl realismo selectivo es el ‘tipo’ de realismo científico más común. Este realismo agrupa diversas perspectivas sobre la ciencia, las teorías científicas y las teorías de la verdad, por lo que ha resultado muy difícil definirlo con precisión. Sin embargo, hay tres elementos que, supuestamente, son suficientes para caracterizar esta posición: una motivación del Argumento de No Milagros, una motivación de la Meta Inducción Pesimista y el carác-ter selectivo. Aquí sostengo que la esta caracterización no es lo suficientemente robusta para señalar todos los elementos que los realistas selectivos de hecho comparten. En particular, sostengo que tal caracterización impide que los realistas selectivos prohíban la posibilidad de que las contradicciones estén conectadas con la verdad (dialeteias), incluso si éstas son no deseablesspa
dc.description.abstractenglishSelective Realism is the most-common ‘type’ of scientific realism. It groups many di-verse approaches to science, theories, and truth, and so, it is very difficult to define it with precision. Yet, there are three elements which, allegedly, suffice for a general char-acterization of this view, namely: a Non-Miracles Argument motivation, a Pessimistic Meta-Induction motivation and selectivity. I contend that such characterization is not robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. In particular, I argue that such characterization prevents selective realists from blocking the possibility of true contradictions, dialetheias, even if they are not desirable.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.18270/rcfc.v19i38.2411
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.issn0124-4620
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad El Bosquespa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repositorio.unbosque.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/6164
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher.journalRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia;0124-4620, Vol. 19 Núm. 38.2019spa
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dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/2411
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.accessrightshttps://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso abiertospa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.subjectRealismo selectivospa
dc.subjectContradicciónspa
dc.subjectDialeteiaspa
dc.subjectMeta-Inducción pesimistaspa
dc.subject.keywordsSelective Realismspa
dc.subject.keywordsContradictionspa
dc.subject.keywordsDialetheiaspa
dc.subject.keywordsPessimistic Meta Inductionspa
dc.title¿Eres un realista selectivo dialeteísta y no te has dado cuenta?spa
dc.title.translatedAre you a selective-realist dialetheist without knowing it?spa
dc.type.coarhttps://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversionhttps://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.hasversioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo de revistaspa

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