Show simple item record

dc.creatorVila Pérez, Juan Manuel
dc.date2016-05-11
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-12T19:19:29Z
dc.date.available2019-06-12T19:19:29Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/1276
dc.identifier10.18270/rcfc.v15i31.1276
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12495/1025
dc.descriptionScientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an “ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I suggest that positions known as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories.en-US
dc.descriptionScientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an “ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I suggest that positions known as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories.es-AR
dc.descriptionScientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an “ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I suggest that positions known as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories.es-ES
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad El Bosquees-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unbosque.edu.co/index.php/rcfc/article/view/1276/874
dc.relation10.18270/rcfc.v15i31.1276.g874
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2015 Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; ##issue.vol## 15 ##issue.no## 31 (2015): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-AR
dc.sourceRevista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol. 15 Núm. 31 (2015): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Cienciaes-ES
dc.source2463-1159
dc.source0124-4620
dc.titleA critique of Ontological Pluralism: the case for Quantum Mechanicsen-US
dc.titleA critique of Ontological Pluralism: the case for Quantum Mechanicses-AR
dc.titleA critique of Ontological Pluralism: the case for Quantum Mechanicses-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record